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Introduction 
 
 
The G-20 and the Dilemma of 
Asymmetric Sovereignty 
Why Multilateralism Is Failing in Crisis Prevention 
Heribert Dieter and Maria Krummenacher 
The Group of Twenty (G-20) is not able to move forward with the reforms necessary 
to prevent future financial crises. Successes achieved in crisis management cannot be 
transformed into joint crisis prevention. The global regulation of financial markets, 
agreed upon at previous G-20 summits, was intended to make the international finan-
cial system more stable and more resilient against future crises. Alas, the expectations 
were unfulfilled. At least as serious are the failure of the Doha Round and the incapa-
bility of the G-20 to prevent it, despite the frequently voiced commitment to a multilat-
eral order. The structural crisis in current global regulation is not least the result of 
an asymmetric sovereignty in financial politics: States possess only marginal influence 
on international financial markets, but they are liable in times of crisis. The result is 
a renationalization of financial policies. At the same time, the increasingly critical per-
ception of globalization, in particular in societies of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), complicates the further evolution of the multi-
lateral trade order. 
 
Supranational regulation of a range of 
issues has been on the agenda of inter-
national politics for more than two 
decades. “Global Governance,” particu-
larly in economic affairs, was considered 
a promising concept. The development 
of shared norms and standards in finance 
should have helped to reduce risks and 
prevent future crises. This concept was 
embodied in the foundation of the G-20 in 
1999 as a reaction to the financial crises 
of the late 1990s. In the beginning, G-20 
meetings were limited to finance ministers, 
and it was not until November 2008 that 
they included heads of state and govern-
ment. This was deemed a breakthrough by 
some observers: Finally, the problems of 
increasingly interdependent economies 
would be solved at the global level. 
The crisis management of the G-20 
raised hopes 
Initially, the G-20 fulfilled expectations. The 
global economic and financial crisis was 
managed without a relapse to protectionist 
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trade policies or harmful competitive 
devaluations. From 2008 to 2011, the G-20 
was able to implement some significant 
steps, for example the modernization of the 
International Monetary Fund. At the G-20 
summit before last, in Cannes in November 
2011, the development of shared rules for 
the financial markets was still high on the 
agenda. But only non-binding memoranda 
of understanding were agreed upon. 
In the two years since the G-20 summit 
in Cannes, some countries have chosen to 
go their own way, and it has become evi-
dent that there will be no joint approach 
to the regulation of financial markets. 
Notably, the United States (US) has not only 
enacted unilateral reforms of its financial 
markets but has also eliminated one of the 
established pillars of financial regulation. 
Authorities in the US no longer accept the 
so-called home country principle and have 
shifted unilaterally to the host country prin-
ciple, according to which banks operating 
in the US must also hold capital in the US. 
The US has terminated the former consen-
sus of the OECD countries by implementing 
the host country principle in banking super-
vision: Financial institutions are being 
supervised where they operate, not in the 
country where their headquarters are 
located. This has far-reaching consequences 
that will lead to a segmentation of markets. 
In the future, Deutsche Bank, for instance, 
will have to hold capital in New York for its 
American business – rather than in Frank-
furt as had been the case up to now. 
Just like the US, more countries have 
chosen individual national paths for their 
financial policies. For example, right from 
the beginning of the crisis, Brazil had 
raised a tax on capital inflows at rates of 
2 to 6 percent and only abandoned this 
measure on June 5, 2013. Switzerland has 
chosen special capital requirements for its 
two largest banks, UBS and Credit Suisse, 
thereby deviating strongly from the stan-
dards of the Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervision. Whereas large banks will need 
to be holding 13 percent capital by the end 
of the current decade, according to the set 
of measures known as Basel III, Swiss bank-
ing supervision has enforced much higher 
capital requirements and is demanding 
19 percent of risk-weighted assets from its 
two largest banks. 
Liability in the event of a crisis 
What is the reason for this development? 
Why do countries seem to lose faith in 
multilateral approaches, not only, but also 
in the regulation of financial markets? One 
important aspect is the largely dissimilar 
experience with financial crises. For the 
societies of countries with very large finan-
cial sectors – Switzerland, but also Great 
Britain – the crisis of 2008 and 2009 was 
a traumatic experience that the affected 
societies do not wish to repeat. The fiercer 
the crisis and the closer the abyss, the 
stronger the willingness of these societies 
not to settle for a global minimal consen-
sus in financial regulation. 
Of course, a set of rules for financial 
markets in particular is not only about the 
implementation of internationally agreed 
upon regulations, but also about the liabili-
ty for adverse developments. In the event 
of a crisis, governments are at least partly 
responsible for the mistakes of their banks. 
The crises of the last years have shown this 
very clearly. Whether in Ireland, Spain, the 
US, or Belgium, governments have taken 
great financial risks to prevent the collapse 
of their financial systems.  
For numerous governments, the inter-
nationalization of financial markets has led 
to a peculiar as well as precarious situation: 
Although countries possess only indirect 
influence on the international negotiations 
of financial regulation, they are individual-
ly liable in the event of a crisis. Their sover-
eignty is thus asymmetric: The governments 
of sovereign states lacked the instruments 
to minimize the risks that come along with 
their banks’ business; still, they were held 
accountable. The resulting situation has 
become both politically unsatisfying and 
threatens the legitimacy of governments. 
Some G-20 states have responded with the 
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unilaterally implemented measures 
sketched above. 
In principle, individual states would 
indeed have had the ability to tighten their 
financial market regulations well before 
the recent crises in the US and in Europe. 
Thereby, they would have lowered the risks 
for their public finance. However, before 
the outbreak of the crises, it was politically 
difficult to find support for a prudent 
policy. Banks successfully referred to the 
competitive environment in which they 
have to operate and pointed to the liberal 
banking supervisions in other countries. So, 
prior to the crises, we saw a leveling of the 
supervision to the lowest common level, 
which, however – as we know today – was 
highly inadequate. 
A second reason for the growing interest 
in the re-nationalization of financial poli-
tics is the experience from the bankruptcy 
of Iceland’s banking system. The three 
major Icelandic banks were initially grow-
ing rapidly abroad, implementing daring 
business models. Equally quick was their 
demise as all three banks slipped into bank-
ruptcy. The assumption that a state will 
guarantee the liabilities that its insolvent 
banks have in other countries was plausible 
until Iceland failed to honor the obligations 
of its banks. The events in Iceland have 
weakened this expectation. The faith in 
guarantees of national governments – a 
central element of the home country prin-
ciple in banking supervision – has been 
fundamentally shaken. The bankruptcy of 
Cypriot banks, although somewhat differ-
ent in detail, has fuelled further doubts. 
That is one more reason why the US is shift-
ing toward the host country principle. 
Why do global approaches fail? 
Yet, tightening the rules for financial mar-
ket regulation is not the only field where 
the G-20 is failing. Despite the mantra-like 
repetition of memoranda of understanding, 
the trade ministers of the G-20 have not 
been able to overcome their conflicts of in-
terest and reach a settlement in the Doha 
Round of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). What are the reasons for this 
failure? 
Although the G-20 managed to prevent a 
revival of protectionist measures on a broad 
front in the midst of the crisis, there is a 
large gap between the announcements of 
the G-20 and quantifiable results in trade 
policy. There is not one final communiqué 
that lacks a clear statement stressing the 
importance of the WTO and the necessity to 
conclude the Doha Round. Nonetheless, the 
reality of trade policy looks very different. 
All the states that are preventing the con-
clusion of the Doha Round through their 
vetoes are members of the G-20. 
Despite there being little public infor-
mation available on the reasons for the 
deadlock in the Doha Round, it is known 
that the US, Brazil, and China are blocking 
its conclusion. The emerging economies 
Brazil and China oppose the US’s demand 
for the complete elimination of tariffs on 
industrial goods. Conversely, the US resists 
the request to comprehensively abandon 
subsidies to the agricultural sector. 
Thus, the Doha Round is not concluded 
because three important members of the 
G-20 no longer believe in multilateral solu-
tions and would rather engage in preferen-
tial agreements. For experts in the field of 
international trade, this is a paradox. There 
is a broad consensus that a single rulebook 
for international trade would facilitate eco-
nomic growth and contribute to a world-
wide increase in prosperity. This, however, 
cannot be said for the currently popular free 
trade agreements. So why are the countries 
in the G-20 incapable of further developing 
the common rules for international trade? 
One explanation is the lack of a hege-
monic power that is willing to guarantee 
compliance with the rules of the game, but 
at the same time establish a system that 
provides member countries with sufficient 
economic benefits. In any event, this is how 
the postwar economy emerged: The US 
enforced the system of Bretton Woods and 
made sure that the participation in this 
economic regime remained attractive. Of 
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course, the Bretton Woods regime never 
was a truly global system, since member 
countries of the Council on Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance did not participate. Still, 
within the bipolar order of the Cold War, 
the US managed to keep the system open 
and stable. 
After the collapse of the USSR and the 
following short-lived “unipolar moment” 
(Charles Krauthammer) of complete hegem-
ony of the US, the multilateral order was 
being advanced until 1995, the founding 
year of the WTO. Since the turn of the mil-
lennium and the parallel emergence of a 
multipolar order, nearly all attempts to or-
ganize cooperation without hegemony (Bob 
Keohane) have failed. The present multi-
polar world is characterized by superficial 
cooperation. Global Governance, whether 
in policies to prevent further climate 
change or in economic policy, remains on 
hold. Even worse: The world is returning to 
regulation on the level of the nation-state 
and non-cooperation. The American polit-
ical scientist Ian Bremmer refers to the 
resulting situation as “G-Zero,” an era in 
which groups such as the G-20 will no 
longer play a vital role. 
The negative perception of the 
international division of labor 
Apparently, there is no such thing as an 
identity of interests of individual states, as 
assumed by the advocates of global regu-
lation and global governance. In other 
words: The gap between the preferences of 
individual states is widening rather than 
narrowing. However, governments must 
respect the preferences of their societies in 
the formulation of policies if they do not 
wish to lose legitimacy. Then again, the dif-
ferent preferences of societies are the im-
mediate result of severely diverging percep-
tions of the international division of labor. 
Even in the G-20, individual societies have 
very different perceptions of the effects of 
globalization and its economic effects. 
In Europe and the US, many people are 
increasingly critical of the international 
division of labor, if not outright hostile to 
globalization. According to a number of 
surveys, only about one-fifth to one-third 
of the respondents in OECD countries see 
greater opportunities than risks in globali-
zation. Even in Germany, numerous poli-
ticians and citizens have been critical of 
globalization, although Germany strongly 
benefits from open markets and the result-
ing intensification of international trade. 
Without a political anchoring in the 
member states, the G-20 has no future 
The unfavorable perceptions of globaliza-
tion and the outlined asymmetric sover-
eignty have resulted in a standstill in the 
G-20. Instead of a further development of 
the multilateral order, at best the status 
quo will be preserved. This is why we can 
expect nothing substantial – at least in 
terms of economic policy and financial 
regulation – from the G-20 summit in 
St. Petersburg on September 5 and 6. 
The structural impediments to successful 
financial regulation and trade policies on 
a supranational level cannot be overcome 
by the heads of government and state of the 
G-20. At least there is some hope in those 
areas where the countries of the G-20 have 
identical interests. This applies primarily 
to measures to close down tax loopholes. 
In 2008, ambitious expectations of a com-
prehensive reorganization of international 
trade relations through the G-20 were 
raised. Unfortunately, the G-20 cannot and 
will not deliver on crisis prevention. Today, 
more modest goals will have to be set. The 
key obstacle to success in the further devel-
opment of global rules in trade and finance 
can be found in the G-20 societies them-
selves. Perceptions about globalization need 
to be addressed by policy makers at the 
national level, as do the widespread reser-
vations about the international division of 
labor in the OECD countries. If societies 
continue to show diverging preferences, the 
development of comprehensive global eco-
nomic governance in the G-20 will be all 
but impossible. 
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